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Abstract. This paper oﬀers an analysis of indexical expressions and proper
names as they are used in proverbs. Both indexicals and proper names con-
tribute properties rather than objects to the propositions expressed when they
are used in sentences interpreted as proverbs. According to the proposal, their
contribution is accounted for by the mechanism of descriptive anaphora. Index-
icals with rich linguistic meaning, such as ‘I’, ‘you’ or ‘today’, turn out to be
cases of the attributive uses of indexicals, i.e. uses whose contribution relies on
the linguistic meaning of the word. Third person pronouns, names of locations
as well as surnames are analyzed as non-attributive descriptive uses.
Keywords: indexicals, proverbs, descriptive indexicals, attributive uses of index-
icals.
1. Introduction
In “Demonstratives” David Kaplan proposed an analysis of indexicals,
according to which an indexical such as “today” refers to the day of utter-
ance on each of its deictic uses. But in a footnote to the same paper (1989,
page 510), when he discusses the possibility of the existence of character
shifting operators – which he calls monsters – and claims that English does
not contain such operators, Kaplan mentions a possible exception to his own
thesis. The exception is the following proverb:
(*) Never put oﬀ until tomorrow what you can do today.
Kaplan asks rhetorically “What can one say about this?”.1
Instead of addressing the question of the existence of monsters directly,
I will try to answer the rhetorical question of Kaplan. I will propose an
interpretation of indexicals in proverbs according to which uses of indexicals
in proverbs are a special case of the descriptive use of indexicals.
My paper will thus consist of two parts: in the ﬁrst part (Sections 2)
I will introduce my analysis of descriptive indexicals and in the second
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(Sections 3 and 4) I will use the mechanisms just introduced for the analysis
of proverbs such as (*) as well as for proverbs containing proper names.
2. Descriptive Uses of Indexicals
There are many types of uses of pronouns and Kaplan was concerned
only with what linguists call the deictic uses. But for the pronoun ‘he’, for
example, we can mention at least 5 types of uses:2
(1) He1 [pointing at John Paul II] is speaking bad Italian. deictic
(2) If John Paul II does not practice his Italian, he2 will anaphoric
always have a Polish accent.
(3) If somebody does not practice his Italian, he3 will bound
always have an accent.
(4) He4 [pointing at a picture of John Paul II] is my hero. deferred
(5) He5 is usually an Italian, but this time they thought descriptive
it wise to elect a Pole.
[uttered by someone gesturing towards JP II as he delivers a speech
with a Polish accent shortly after his election]
Descriptive uses of indexicals are uses where indexical utterances ex-
press general propositions (see Nunberg 1993, 2004; Recanati 1993, 2005;
Elbourne 2005, 2008; Hunter 2010, Stokke 2010, Galery 2008, Kijania-Placek
2012, 2012a, 2014, 2015, 2015a, 2016). In example (5) one expresses not
a singular proposition about John Paul II, but a general one, concerning
all popes. Because ‘usually’ is a quantiﬁer that requires a range of values
to quantify over, and because ‘he’ in its standard interpretation provides
just one object, there is a tension in this sentence which triggers the search
for an alternative interpretation. The tension is not caused by the fact that
John Paul II himself is the possible referent but it is a tension between the
generality of the quantiﬁer and the singularity of the indexical in its default
interpretation. The tension would be there regardless of who the referent
was. Intuitively we know that with the use of the pronoun ‘he’ we point
at John Paul II and by doing so we make his property of being the pope
more salient. We know that it is this property that plays a role in the truth
conditions of the proposition expressed, which is ‘Most popes are Italian’.
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2.1. The Mechanism of Descriptive Anaphora
I propose treating descriptive uses of indexicals as a special kind of
anaphoric use which I call descriptive.3 In the mechanism of descriptive
anaphora, the antecedent of the anaphora stems from the extra-linguistic
context: it is an object identiﬁed through the linguistic meanings of the
pronoun (in the case of pure indexicals) or by demonstration (for demon-
stratives). In a communication context, those objects serve as a means of
expressing content and, as such, they acquire semantic properties. The an-
tecedent is used as a pointer to a property corresponding to it in a contextu-
ally salient manner and that property contributes to the general proposition
expressed. The structure of the general proposition is determined by the bi-
nary quantiﬁer that triggered the mechanism of descriptive anaphora in the
ﬁrst place. The anaphora is descriptive in the sense that the antecedent
does not give a referent for the pronoun. It gives a property which is not
a referent – the property retrieved from the context serves as a context set
that limits the domain of the quantiﬁcation of the quantiﬁer.
The descriptive use of an indexical is not its basic use. The descriptive
interpretation process is triggered by the semantic inadequacy of its ba-
sic uses: deictic, (classically) anaphoric, or deferred. Typically, descriptive
anaphora is triggered at the level of linguistic meaning by the use of quan-
tifying words such as ‘traditionally’, ‘always’, or ‘usually’, whose linguistic
meanings clash with the singularity of the default referential reading of in-
dexicals (and those quantiﬁers need not be overt). As a result, the pronoun’s
basic referential function is suppressed.
Coming back to example (5),
(5) He is usually an Italian.
The linguistic meaning of ‘he’ requires reference to one particular person
but ‘usually’ is a quantiﬁer that here quantiﬁes over a set of people. This
tension triggers a search for an alternative interpretation via descriptive
anaphora, with John Paul II as the demonstrated antecedent. I repeat that
John Paul II is not the semantic value for ‘he’ as no antecedent is ever
a value for the anaphora – it gives the value. The salient property of John
Paul II – ‘being a pope’ – is the semantic value of ‘he’. ‘usually’ is a binary
quantiﬁer – USUALLYx(ϕ(x), ψ(x)) – analysed according to the generalized
quantiﬁers theory (e.g. Barwise and Cooper 1981).4 The structure of the
proposition is thus as follows:
USUALLYx(POPE(x), ITALIAN(x)),
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and USUALLY has the truth conditions of the majority quantiﬁer:5
Mgi |= USUALLYx(ϕ(x), ψ(x)) iﬀ |ϕMgi ∩ ψMgi| > |ϕMgi\ψMgi|.
Such an analysis gives the intuitive reading for (5).
In general, the structure of the interpretation can be given by the fol-
lowing schema:
IND is Qψ ⇒ Qx(ϕ(x), ψ(x))
where IND is an indexical, Q is a quantiﬁer, ϕ is the property corresponding
to the object which is the antecedent of IND and ⇒ should be read as
‘expresses the proposition’. I take it that adverbs of quantiﬁcation, such
as ‘always’ or ‘usually’, quantify over events or objects.
2.2. Other Types of Descriptive Indexicals
I distinguish two other types of descriptive uses of indexicals (compare
Kijania-Placek 2012, 2015 and 2015a). They diﬀer only in what causes the
search for an alternative interpretation, but the mechanism of the interpre-
tation is the same. In type II, the descriptive interpretation is considered as
a result of the unavailability of a referent in the context. Some propositional
attitude ascriptions can be analysed in this way (compare Kijania-Placek
2015). I will not talk about these cases, however, as they will not be impor-
tant in the analysis of proverbs.
In type III, the descriptive interpretation is considered because of the
irrelevance of the referential interpretation. Usually there would be a conﬂict
with the pragmatic purpose of the utterance such as a warning, or scolding.
I will show what I mean with the help of an example of Emma Borg:
‘You shouldn’t have done that, she might have been a dangerous criminal’
said to the child who has just let her sweet, grey-haired grandmother in, but
without checking ﬁrst to see who it was (Borg 2002).
Assuming the referential interpretation of ‘she’, this sentence is seman-
tically consistent and attributes a modal property to the grandmother. Such
a proposition is true if and only if the grandmother is a dangerous criminal
in a counterfactual situation. Such a trivial proposition is, however, impo-
tent as a rebuke: in a metaphysical sense, everybody could be a dangerous
criminal. Somebody would have to be a criminal in the actual situation to be
a threat to the child and we assumed that the grandmother is not dangerous
in this sense. The sense of the scolding is thus not a singular proposition
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about the grandmother and so the propositional contribution of ‘she’ is not
the grandmother herself.
But perhaps the mistake was to interpret the possibility metaphysically.
Maybe we should interpret it epistemically: “For what you knew, it has not
been excluded that...”? Indeed, Recanati (1993) claims that the epistemic
interpretation of modals in such contexts saves the referential interpretation
of indexicals. I think he is wrong in this respect: it is simply not true that
the child did not know about her grandmother that she was not a dangerous
criminal. On the contrary, by the assumption that constitutes this example,
the child knew that her grandmother was not a dangerous criminal. But the
idea of an epistemic interpretation of the modal is, I think, correct, because
the concept of scolding assumes the relevance of the actual situation, not
counterfactual ones. So the epistemic interpretation of modality, together
with the mechanism of descriptive anaphora give the relevant interpreta-
tion of (6):
(6) She might have been a dangerous criminal.
We search the context for a salient property of the grandmother, who is
the demonstrated antecedent of ‘she’. In this case it is ‘being the person
who rung the bell’. The quantiﬁer which gives the structure of the general
proposition embedded under the modal operator is here the covered deﬁnite
description quantiﬁer. As a result we obtain the proposition:
MIGHT-HAVEepist(THEx(RINGS-THE-BELL(x), CRIMINAL(x))),
where the truth conditions for the deﬁnite description quantiﬁer are the
expected ones,
Mgi |= THEx(ϕ(x), ψ(x)) iﬀ |ϕMgi| = 1 and ϕMgi ⊆ ψMgi,
and MIGHT-HAVEepist is the epistemic modality relativized to the relevant in
this context information base, i.e. the knowledge of the child at the mo-
ment of opening the door. We thus get: ‘Your knowledge at the moment
of opening the door did not exclude it that the person who rung the bell
was a dangerous criminal’, which is the intended interpretation (compare
Kijania-Placek 2015a).
But the irrelevance of referential interpretations, which triggers the
mechanism of descriptive anaphora, is not always connected with modal
contexts. Let us consider another example of Nunberg. A doctor during
a lecture points to his own chest and utters:
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(7) When a person is shot here, we can usually conclude that it was
not suicide. (Nunberg 1993)
Here ‘usually’ does not quantify over persons being shot but over events
of shooting a particular place. Because it is not excluded that somebody
might be shot several times during one event, there is no semantic incon-
sistency between the referential reading of ‘here’ and the quantiﬁer ‘usu-
ally’. It is thus not a case of a descriptive use of an indexical of type I.
But, anyhow, we are not concerned with the particular place demonstrated,
because it is obvious for the addressee that the speaker is demonstrating
a chest which has not been shot at in the relevant way pertaining to mur-
der. The referential interpretation would thus give a blatantly false and
thus irrelevant proposition. That is why while interpreting (7) we deploy
the mechanism of descriptive anaphora and treat the demonstrated place
as an antecedent for ‘here’. The antecedent gives us the semantic value for
‘here’ and the semantic value is the salient property of ‘being a place in the
middle of the chest’.
This example is especially interesting, because its structure is based on
an implication in the scope of an adverb of quantiﬁcation ‘usually’:
USUALLY(α→ β).
Such a structure is postulated for all adverbs of quantiﬁcation (Quine 1941,
Lewis 1975) but it is seldom explicit. As a result, the indexical ‘here’ in this
example does not provide the ﬁrst argument of the quantiﬁer in full, but
just completes it. The resulting proposition is the following:
USUALLYx(SHOT-IN-CHEST(x), CAN-ASSUME(¬SUICIDE(x)))
– “Usually we can conclude that a shot in the chest was not a suicide”.
3. Proverbs
Proverbs by their very nature express general rules or truths and do
not concern just particular cases.6 I think that it is exactly the context of
a proverb that triggers the non-referential, general reading of the indexical.
After all, if somebody does not recognize a saying as a proverb, he can see
it as concerning himself directly and interpret the indexical referentially.
But such a reading trivialises the proverb. It is thus the irrelevance of the
64 Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/7/16 10:19 AM
Indexicals and Names in Proverbs
referential interpretation that triggers the descriptive interpretation, which
makes indexicals used in proverbs cases of descriptive uses of indexicals
of type III.
3.1. Attributive Uses of Indexicals
In typical cases of descriptive readings, like example (5), indexicals do
not contribute their linguistic meaning to the proposition expressed but
rather some other property which is salient in the context. However, I will
try to show that the context of a proverb is a special context that triggers
the interpretation of some indexicals – and proper names, see Section 4
– via the property which is part of their indexical meaning. Thus I call
such special kinds of the descriptive uses of indexicals attributive uses, in
analogy to Donnellan’s (1966) attributive uses of deﬁnite description, whose
propositional contribution is their linguistic meaning.
Particularly interesting here are the uses of ﬁrst and second person
pronouns or words such as ‘today’ or ‘yesterday’, which have rich linguistic
meaning. I will introduce my analysis with the help of the initial example:
(*) Never put oﬀ until tomorrow what you can do today.
If we recognize the sentence as a proverb, we are additionally aware that the
interpretation should not rely on particular features of the context of use,
which would be what we do in typical cases of descriptive interpretation.
Yet if we abstract from individual occasions of use, what is left is the prop-
erty that is common to all addressees of the sentence, i.e. the property of
‘being the addressee’, which is part of the linguistic meaning of ‘you’. This
property contributes to the proposition expressed, making this descriptive
use of the indexical attributive.7
There are three indexicals in this sentence, ‘you’, ‘today’, and ‘tomor-
row’. Their linguistic meaning is, respectively: ‘the addressee’, ‘the day of
utterance’, and ‘the day following the day of utterance’. I will ignore the
metaphorical air of ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’ here and concentrate ﬁrst on
this use of ‘you’. According to the descriptive anaphora interpretation, the
antecedent of this indexical is the object given in the context by the lin-
guistic meaning of the indexical. But the context of a proverb makes us
abstract from particular properties of the individual and concentrate on his
general property of being the addressee in this case. As everybody is the
addressee of a proverb, this property boils down to something like ‘being
human’. In the same way, ‘today’ brings the property of ‘being a present
day’ and ‘tomorrow’ – of ‘being a future day’.
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In the case of (*), ‘you’ and ‘today’ limit the domain of quantiﬁcation
of the quantiﬁer ‘never’ – we are talking here about activities which should
be done at a particular time – while ‘tomorrow’ contributes to the second
argument of the quantiﬁer. The quantiﬁer can be overt, like in this case, or
covered, like in
(8) Do not put oﬀ until tomorrow what you can do today.
In (*), the quantiﬁer ‘never’ quantiﬁes over events. According to Davidson’s
semantics (Davidson 1980), there is a place for an agent and time in the
structure of every event (the place of the event and other aspects will not
be considered here). The structure of the expressed general proposition will
thus, ignoring the imperative mode of the utterance, be:
EVERYx(AGENT-IS-HUMAN(x) ∧ CAN(DO-IN-DAY-OF-UTTERANCE(x)),
¬PUT-OFF-UNTIL-NEXT-DAY(x)).
‘Never’ is a negative counterpart of a general quantiﬁer, but the force of
the negation concerns the ‘put oﬀ’ verb and is thus relegated to the sec-
ond argument of the universal quantiﬁer. The universal quantiﬁer has the
following natural truth conditions:
Mgi |= EVERYx(ϕ(x), ψ(x)) iﬀ ϕMgi ⊆ ψMgi
By limiting the range of quantiﬁcation to objects that might be subjects
to obligations, we make the limitation to people redundant and the propo-
sition – with ‘should’ added by the imperative mode not explicitly analysed
here – is thus: ‘Nothing, which could be done in a particular day should be
postponed until next day’. The metaphorical aspect of ‘the following day’
(as well as of ‘the a particular day’), which stretches the sense of the phrase
to ‘in the future’ I leave here unanalysed.
We might ask why are not all descriptive uses attributive, at least the
uses of pure indexicals, if the property that is part of their linguistic meaning
is always available? The answer is that its constant presence works exactly
against its salience, which is necessary for the mechanism of descriptive
anaphora to work. We must abstract from the particular context of use, as
we do in proverbs, to make the property included in the linguistic meaning
visible.
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3.2. Non-Attributive Descriptive Uses of Indexicals in Proverbs
The rich linguistic meaning of indexicals such as ‘you’, ‘today’, or ‘to-
morrow’ makes them especially useful for expressing very general content.
Other examples can be found in The Oxford Dictionary of English Proverbs,
such as:
Tomorrow never comes.
One hour today is worth two tomorrow.
You are what you eat.
The more you get, the more you want.
If you play with ﬁre you get burnt.
Practise what you preach.
You cannot lose what you never had.
Be careful what you pray for, you might get it.
As you make your bed, so you must lie upon it.
Demonstratives such as ‘he’ or ‘she’, whose linguistic meaning is sparse
and of rather a negative character – ‘he’ means something like ‘a male salient
in the context, who is neither the addressee nor the speaker’ – are usually
not used for expression of a completely general content but are used in
proverbs whose application is limited to particulate types of situations. Let
me give another example of Nunberg’s:
[W]e are at a party and see Ralph in friendly conversation with Clovis, appar-
ently unaware that Clovis has been carrying on a clandestine aﬀair with his
wife. I point at Ralph and say:
(9) It’s like they say: he is always the last one to know
(Nunberg 1993)
The phrase ‘like they say’ cancels any doubts as to the nature of the utter-
ance – it is a proverb of some kind and the sense of the proverb is general. It
is thus this phrase that triggers the descriptive interpretation. Here it will
not be an attributive interpretation because the linguistic meaning of ‘he’
does not specify any particular role in communication but a descriptive
one which is based on a particular property of an individual, salient in
the context. The relevant property we are looking for here is a property of
the demonstrated object – Ralph, whose salient property is that of ‘being
a husband’. The context of a proverb gives the generality of the proposition
67Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/7/16 10:19 AM
Katarzyna Kijania-Placek
– we are concerned not just with this particular husband but with any hus-
band and the structure is given this time by a covered universal quantiﬁer
EVERYx(HUSBAND(x), ψ(x)). This quantiﬁer quantiﬁes over people.
But there is another quantiﬁer in this sentence – ‘always’ – and it quan-
tiﬁes over events. The property that limits the domain of quantiﬁcation of
this quantiﬁer is given by a covered argument of the verb ‘know’. It is a verb
expressing a relation between somebody who knows and the something he
knows. The relevant property is ‘an aﬀair of one’s wife’ and thus we get the
following proposition:
EVERYx(HUSBAND(x), ALWAYSy(AFFAIR-OF-WIFE-OF(y, x),
LAST-ONE-TO-KNOW-OF(x, y)))
– ‘(Every) husband is always the last one to know (about his wife’s aﬀair)’.
The truth conditions of the quantiﬁer ‘always’ are those of a universal quan-
tiﬁer:
Mgi |= ALWAYSx(ϕ(x), ψ(x)) iﬀ ϕMgi ⊆ ψMgi.
Perhaps it is instructive to explain why the analysed examples are not
classiﬁed as descriptive uses of type I. After all, there are quantiﬁers such
as ‘never’ and ‘always’ present, which makes them superﬁcially similar to
(5) He is usually an Italian.
The reason why I do not classify them in the same way is that in (5) it is not
just the co-occurrence of ‘usually’ and ‘he’ that triggers the descriptive inter-
pretation, but the fact that in this usage the quantiﬁer quantiﬁes over those
same type of objects – people – that the pronoun refers to. In (9) the overt
quantiﬁer quantiﬁes over events and such a quantiﬁcation is in principle not
incompatible with one person being an agent of all those events. So it is
only the irrelevance of the referential interpretation, not its semantic incon-
sistency, which triggers the descriptive interpretation and that is why (9) is
a case of descriptive indexicals of type III. The same is true for (7).
4. Proper Names in Proverbs
Proper names are usually used to refer to particular persons or things,
with the exclusion of others. However, in proverbs their semantic contribu-
tion is not referential as they enable predication about anybody who meets
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a certain condition. Since proper names in proverbs seem to behave like
indexicals, i.e. their referential function is suppressed and their contribution
is general, in this section I will try to apply the interpretational strategies
proposed for indexicals in Section 3 to proper names.
My initial empirical observation is that there are not that many exam-
ples of proper names in proverbs.8 At the end of this section I will venture
an explanation of this fact. Additionally, the proper names being used are
either ﬁrst names on the one hand or surnames and location names on the
other. I believe that these two groups have diﬀerent types of contribution
to the truth condition of an utterance and in what follows I will propose
an analysis that relies on the mechanism of descriptive anaphora but treats
only the ﬁrst group as attributive.
4.1. First Names in Proverbs
I will concentrate on the analysis of the following examples:
(10) All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy,9
(11) Czego Jaś się nie nauczy, tego Jan nie będzie umiał.
[Polish, gloss: What little Johnny will not learn, John will not know.]
The intended meaning of (10) is not limited to speciﬁc Jack and that of (11)
to speciﬁc Jan. Rather, the contribution of ‘Jack’ in (10) is the general
condition of being a man.
4.1.1. Predicative Analysis of Proper Names in Proverbs
According to referentialist theories of the semantics of proper names
(Mill 1843, Kripke 1972/1980, Perry 2012, Kaplan 1989, Jeshion 2015,
Recanati 1993, Soames 2002, Salmon 1986), the semantic contribution of
a name is an individual object (or person). Descriptive theories of proper
names (Frege 1892, Russell 1911, Strawson 1959, Searle 1958, Jackson 1998,
Chalmers 2004, Poller 2014) postulate descriptive condition as a semantic
value, but since this condition must be an identifying condition, the re-
sulting meaning concerns just an individual bearer of a proper name as
well. Predicativism about proper names (Burge 1973, Matuschansky 2008,
Fara 2015) on the other hand, is a theory according to which proper names
are not singular terms but predicates and thus these theories seem to pro-
vide the appropriate – not singular – kind of condition. Yet, predicativists
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propose a very speciﬁc condition for a name like ‘Jack’, the so-called Being
Called Condition. Fara claims that proper names are “multiply applicable
predicates that are true of just those things that are bearers of the name”
(2015a, p. 251), where by a bearer she means any individual who happens
to be called by that name.
BCC, Being Called Condition
(BCC) ‘N’ (when a predicate) is true of a thing just in case it is called N.10
Since according to Fara “names are predicates in all of their occurrences”
(Fara 2015, p. 60), for the name ‘Jack’, as it appears in (10), we would have:
(BCC-Jack) ‘Jack’ is true of a thing just in case it is called Jack,
and the semantic value of this name would be
[[Jack]] = {x : x is called Jack}
But it is no part of the semantic contribution of ‘Jack’ in (10) that
a person is called Jack. Thus, while predicativism gives the right form of
a semantic value – a multiply applicable condition – it does not give an
adequate content of that condition.
4.1.2. Attributive Analysis of First Names in Proverbs
The general, multiply applicable condition contributed by a name in
a proverb can be accounted for with the help of the same mechanism of
descriptive anaphora which I have proposed for the analysis of indexicals in
proverbs in Section 3. On this analysis, a name used descriptively, as in (10),
would be (descriptively) anaphoric on a particular Jack, available in the
context of an utterance, which Jack would contribute his salient feature
to the proposition expressed.11 But since the context of a proverb invites
abstraction from individual contexts of use, no speciﬁc features, particular
just to Jack, will be relevant here. Yet, if we abstract away from all of the
particular features, we are left with the condition stemming from the fact
that ‘Jack’ is prototypically a name of a person, of a man; ‘a man’ in its
general meaning comprising females as well. This general feature may be
constrained by the linguistic context of the utterance, as I will exemplify in
the next paragraph. Thus the (descriptively) anaphoric use of ‘Jack’ in (10)
– with the universal quantiﬁer supplied by the context of a proverb – gives
the following proposition (I leave the interpretation of ‘boy’ as a person in
this proverb unjustiﬁed):
EVERYx(MAN-WHO-ONLY-WORKS-(x),DULL-PERSON(x)).
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In this case, as it was in the case of attributive uses of indexicals, the
antecedent itself seems to be dispensable, as the resulting feature is not his
or her feature but a general linguistic feature of the expression. This makes
the attributive use of an indexicals and of proper names a limiting case of
a descriptive use and the term ‘attributive use’ derives from the fact that the
resulting semantic contribution consists of features linguistically connected
with the expression in question.
The interpretation of ‘Jack’ is a bit diﬀerent in
(12) Every Jack has his Jill.12
due to the interplay between ‘Jack’ and ‘Jill’. In analogy to the meaning
of ‘a man’ that can mean both a person in general or a male person, while
‘a woman’ always means only a female person, a semantic contribution of
a feminine name, such as Jill, in proverbs always includes the feature of
being a female. This feature interacts in (12) with the contribution of ‘Jack’,
limiting its extension to male, i.e. non-female, persons. The (descriptively)
anaphoric interpretation of (12) will thus be:
EVERYx(MALE-PERSON(x), EXISTSy(FEMALE-PERSON(y), R(y, x))),
where R is the relation of being the right (appropriate, destined) romantic
partner for somebody. In (11) the semantic contribution of ‘Jan’ (John)
interferes with that of ‘Jaś’ (little Johnny), introducing the properties
of ‘young’ and ‘old/adult’ into the semantic contributions of the respec-
tive names. As a result the mechanism of descriptive anaphora generates
the following proposition:
EVERYx(MAN(x), (EVERYy(LEARNABLE(y) ∧ ¬LEARN-WHILE-YOUNG(x, y),
¬KNOW/BE ABLE TO LEARN-WHILE-ADULT(x, y)))
– ‘What someone does not learn while young, will not know (be able to
learn) as an adult’.
The same mechanism of interference between the semantic contribution
of words can be deployed to account for the historical change in meaning
– or at least in application conditions – of (10). Formerly,13 the connota-
tion of the noun ‘work’ was stereotypically limited to menial work, which
accounts for the fact that ‘Jack’ was “variously used as a familiar name
for a sailor, a member of the common people, a serving man, and one who
does odd jobs” OCDP.14 Today’s usage does not necessarily retain this con-
notation of ‘work’, arguably due to the fact that almost everybody works
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nowadays. Accordingly, The Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs (2015 edition)
elucidates the proverb as a “warning that devoting one’s life entirely to
work, without time oﬀ to relaxation and amusement, makes a person very
boring.” (ODP, p. 352 [my emphasis, KK-P]). Thus the changed meaning of
the words in the linguistic context of a proper name inﬂuences the changed
meaning of the entire proverb by interfering with the interpretation of ﬁrst
names that are part of it.
4.2. Surnames and Location Names in Proverbs
Predicativist theories will be of no help in the interpretation of loca-
tion names in proverbs either, as it seems that ‘being called Rome’ is no
part of the propositional contribution of ‘Rome’ to the general proposition
expressed in proverbs such as:
(13) When in Rome, do as the Romans do.
or
(14) All roads lead to Rome.
But this use is not an attributive use either, because the relevant feature is
not just that of being any location but a much limited feature, stemming
from particular features of the famous Rome itself. The context of a proverb
requires concentration on relatively general features of the town but yet spe-
ciﬁc enough to distinguish it from just any town. So while ‘Jack’ could in
principle be exchanged for any other male name without a change of mean-
ing,15 exchanging ‘Rome’ with ‘Pcim’, a small town in Poland, will leave the
utterance either unintelligible or comprehended only with the help of an
echoic reference to the original proverb and thus inheriting its meaning.16
Interpreted according to the mechanism of descriptive anaphora, the
occurrence of ‘Rome’ in (13) is treated as anaphoric on the town itself and its
semantic contribution is a paradigmatic feature of the town, such as ‘being
an important town’. The immediate linguistic context of the name, i.e. other
words comprising the sentence, contribute to the salience of a particular
feature. Thus in (13) the property might be ‘being a place (town or country)
big and important enough to establish its own social customs and standards’,
for (14) – ‘being a place of great geographical and political importance’,
while for (15):
(15) Rome was not built in a day.
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and its Polish counterpart:
(16) Nie od razu Kraków zbudowano.
[Krakow was not built at once]
it could even be the condition of ‘being a major enterprise’. With univer-
sal quantiﬁers supplied by the context of a proverb, an analogical analysis
of ‘Romans’, and attributive analysis of ‘you’ (see Section 3 above), the
mechanism of descriptive anaphora yields the following proposition as the
interpretation of (13):
EVERYx(MAN(x), EVERYy(COUNTRY(y) ∧ VISITS(x, y),
SHOULD-BEHAVE-LIKE-THE-PEOPLE-IN(x, y))).
Surnames used in proverbs are semantically on a par not with ﬁrst
names but with location names. The meaning of a proverb is derived from
the particular features of the famous bearer of a surname – be it real bearer
or a ﬁctional character – and not only replacing the surname with a dif-
ferent one, but connecting it with a diﬀerent bearer of the same surname
(or a surname of the same form, depending on the criteria of identity for
names one favours), would change the meaning of a proverb or render it
meaningless.17 In the Polish proverb:
(17) Na słowie harcerza polegaj jak na Zawiszy.
[Rely on scout’s name the way you can rely on Zawisza]
the paradigmatically characteristic feature of Zawisza Czarny, a Polish me-
dieval knight famous for his courage, prudence and reliability, is relied upon
and the resulting proposition is:18
EVERYx(SCOUT(x), EVERYyEVERYz(MAN(y) ∧ UTTERED-BY(z, x),
CAN-RELY-TO-A-GREAT-EXTENT-ON(y, z))
– ‘Everybody can rely to a great extent on the word of a scout’.
The analysis proposed above allows for an explanation of the relatively
infrequent use of proper names in proverbs. The probable reason is that the
contribution of a ﬁrst name in a proverb is often very similar, if not identical
to that of an indexical. With an indexical’s much clearer and uncontroversial
linguistic meaning at hand, it is not surprising that their use for the same
aim will be more frequent. Surnames and location names, on the other
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hand, are extremely contextual, which explains why only a few names, such
as Rome, survived the passage of time and reappear in new editions of
dictionaries of proverbs.
5. Conclusion
Based on my interpretation of descriptive indexicals via a mechanism of
descriptive anaphora, I have proposed an analysis of indexicals and proper
names used in proverbs as a special case of descriptive use. Depending on
how rich their linguistic meaning is, the indexicals used in proverbs either
form a subclass of descriptive uses which are attributive – their propositional
contribution is their linguistic meaning – or contribute a property retrieved
from the immediate context of utterance to the proposition expressed. This
explains why indexicals of rich linguistic meaning, such as ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘today’,
or ‘tomorrow’ are often used in proverbs with a very general meaning, while
third person pronouns, whose linguistic meaning does not constrain a very
speciﬁc role in communication for the referent, are used in proverbs whose
meaning is just pertinent to particular types of situation. Within the class of
proper names, ﬁrst names occurring in proverbs are analysable as attributive
uses while surnames and location names, due to their highly contextual
character, as non-attributive descriptive uses.
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1 He attributes this counterexample to Richmond Thomasson (Kaplan 1989, p. 510).
2 Example (5) is taken from Recanati (1993) and is a version of an example by Nun-
berg (1992).
3 Compare Kijania-Placek 2012, 2012a, 2014, 2015, 2015a and 2016.
4 I use SMALLCAPS font style for formal counterparts of natural language quantiﬁers and
predicates.
5 In what follows M is a model, g is an assignment of objects from the domain of the
model to individual variables, i is a context, |= is a satisfaction relation obtaining between
a sentence (or an open formula) and a model and context, under an assignment; ϕ and ψ
are open formulas, |A| signiﬁes the cardinality of the set A, and ϕMgi is the interpretation
of formula ϕ in model M and context i under assignment g.
6 Here I disagree with Predelli (1996), whose analysis gives multiple but still singular
readings for examples such as (*). Compare Everrett (2002). By general rules I do not
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just mean universally quantiﬁed rules and the speciﬁc character of the generality depends
on the quantiﬁer used in the sentence. I thus disagree with Predelli (2001) as well, as
he assumes there that what he calls non-speciﬁc uses of indexicals contain an “implicit
generic operator”, on a par with generic uses of indeﬁnites. Compare Heim (1982).
7 For a more extensive discussion see Kijania-Placek (2012).
8 In contrast to the case of indexicals, which are limited in kind, it is not possible
to make an automated search for names in proverbs. My observation is thus based on
a item by item search of the database “1000 ENGLISH PROVERBS”, accessed from
https://suratiundhiyu.ﬁles.wordpress.com/2011/02/1000-english-proverbs.pdf
9 From The Concise Dictionary of Proverbs [CDP, for short].
10 Fara (2015, p. 64). The BCC condition as well as the details of each predicativist
theory diﬀer among the mentioned authors. The most important, perhaps, is the diﬀer-
ence between ‘the’ predicativists (Fara, Matuschansky) and ‘that’ predicativists (Burge)
that amounts to divergent ways of accounting for referentialist intuitions about “names
appearing as bare singulars in argument position”. The diﬀerences will not, however, be
important for our purposes and thus in what follows I will treat all predicativist theories
as one theory.
11 In the case of proper names – and in contrast to indexicals – the referent of a name
does not have to be present in the immediate context of the utterance. Rather, the context
provides the relevant social convention linking the particular use of a name with a speciﬁc
person.
12 Similar examples include: ‘A good Jack makes a good Jill’ (The Oxford Dictionary of
English Proverbs, ODP for short).
13 Its use was recorded as far back as in Howell 1659; see ODP.
14 This note, although formulated as a general thesis, has in fact been made with ref-
erence to the use of ‘Jack’ in a diﬀerent proverb: ‘Jack is as good as his master’. In this
case the interplay of ‘master’ and ‘Jack’ can account for retaining of the original limited
connotation of the name.
15 We might envisage a language that does not already contain a proverb closely equiv-
alent to ‘Every Jack has his Jill’. Preﬁxing a translation of this proverb into that lan-
guage, with names changed for those which are appropriately typical, with “To coin
a new proverb...” (“To coin a new proverb, every Steﬀen has his Maria” [in that other
language]), would probably be understood in the same way as ‘Every Jack has his Jill’
is in English.
16 On echoic utterances see Sperber & Wilson (1986) and Wilson & Sperber (1992).
17 In “Przysłowia polskie odnoszące się do nazwisk szlacheckich i miejscowości” [Polish
provers referring to noble surnames and location names] Aleksander Weryha-Darowski
gathered and explain the meaning of selected Polish proverbs containing surnames and
location names. Almost all of them are meaningless nowadays and do not function as
proverbs due to the highly contextual character of the names that have been used.
18 The attributive analysis of ‘you’ proceeds according to the mechanism introduced in
Section 3. I leave the synecdochic use of ‘word’ in this example unexplained.
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